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ABSTRACT
Much of the existing Literature on Argentina has cmiphasized the
liberal nature of the economic reforms introdaced during the 1976-1981
military government. A major purpose of this paper is to present evidence
that contradlcts this interpretation. In particular, I emphasiz~ the
imrlementation of pervasive government controls and argue thae the intensity
and Instability of these controls resulted in historically high short-run
flictuations of relative prices of commodities and factors.
The ,aper also .3ddresses some political-economy tssues. This
anralysis, I hope, shotuld help to understand better why policies were what they
were. A couple of important conclusions come out of this discussinn. First,
tCe Elucttiations in relative prices resulted in increased social tensions, but
given the repressive nature of the government, demands put forward by differ-
ent groups for taking corrective acttons were simply ignored. As a conse-
cuence, thf! disequilibrium of the economy -',which in turn was the, result- of,
the government, cont,rols - continued growing,, atnd 5z6'>i last only as long aa
the financlal commiunity supplied the furds that were needed 'to finance the
-- resulcing imba1ances.
A second conclusion is that the long-rnn economic Interests'of those.-
who held effective political control were not fadyored by liberalization
policies. As a matter of fact, the economic interests of the rAl1itary were
sheltered from the competitive forces faced by other parts ct the ,economy.
Helpful conments have been received from Vittorio Corbo, Kutlay Ebiri, Jaime
de Melo and Peter Wogait. I also appreciate comments from participants at the
25th Meeting of the International Studies Association (Atlanta, Georgia),
March 27-31, 1984 where a preliminary version of this paper was presented.
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r. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to present a critical overview of
policy reformis implemented i;- Argentina during 1976-1981. Argentina's attempt
with these reforms, which many have interpreted as liberal policies, failed.
This failure has been taken as an argument by many people not only in
Argentina, but also in other developing countries of why liberalization
policies should not be attempted.
Any given set of policies can fail for several reasons. A necessary
condition for p:;icies to be successful is that they be internally consistent
and credible. On the other hand, if policies depart radically from past
trends, then it is very likely the case that old administrative arrangements
for managing and implementing them will have to be adapted to the new
conditions. Finally, policies can fal.l because the political arrangements to
manage poverful pressure groups that stand,'to-iose are in some sense,
inappropriate.
e ,' I ' 4 ,_, , ,,t;,x , 
The thes"siof the paper is o-trguetha&'on esch of these' dimen"
sions, Argentina s cconomic policies]had imporoaAt ihortcomings. -The paper,
sions., Argentina 9'es nmcpoii
spell!i out 'a nature of the major economic"refoims, And also-presents some-
thoughts on the policy decision mechanism and the political economy that
accompanied these reforms.- These thought3, Ir hope, will help to understand
better why polisies were what they were., I also analyze in this paper the
effects of these policies on cbsolute and relative prices, but I do not
discuss the impact of Lhese changes oni quantities, i.e., on the real structure
of the economy. 1/
Section II is a brief analysis of the initial economic conditions
prevailing before th- shift in political power that took place in March of
1976. Section III presents some brief comments on the 1976-77 devaluation
episode. Such a devaluation was necessary for restoring equilibrium in the
balance of payments and eliminating many of the controls used during the
period of severe payments imbalances. Despite the good start with exchange
rate policies, very soon policymakers became conc,-rned with the pervasive
inflationary trend of the e:onomy. The initial response to this problem was
not different from the traditional one, i.e., the implementation of
macro2economic controls for stabilization purposes. Section IV describes these
controls and the effect they had on absolute and relative macro-prices. The
point here is to irgue that the set of mac'ro-policies adopted during these
years were inconsistent with the publicized government objectives of
liberalizing the economy.
I n 'a very uncertain ma-cr -environment, sbme policies-leading-to ;<
'lower'imp'oort barriers' lerreimpl'emented., Sec'tion V. analyzes the extent
and-appropriateness:.of these- policies. -When viewed in isolation, these
'policies had, important) shortca-mingst. Maany poliA;ticians and economi'sts-haye,
attributed the coscs associated with import pecnetration and the. huge 1980O
trade deficit to these import liberali_zation6policies. A point of;this
section is to emphasize that import penetration was the result,.f currency,
1/ Corbo, et al (1985) presents a su-vey of findings related to the
liberaliza-ion episodes in the Southern Cone including effects on the real,
economy.
overvaluation as well as lower import barriers. I also emphasize here how
trade policy instruments were used to achieve different government
objectives. This in turn led to policy instability and increased uncertainty.
Finally, section VI presents some preliminary thoughts on questions
referring to administrative arrangements and some characteristics cf the
underlying political-economy. In this section I make four points. First, the
underlying exchange rate models of the period under study differed quite
drastically irom the one which some authors have used to interpret the
economic events during the previous Peronist government. 1/ Nevertheless, the
natural tendency to use the exchange rate as an anti-inflAtion instrument did
not disappear. In a sense, economists' models have not been able to sell to
the Argentine body politic the importance of following "realistic" exchange
rate policies.
- Se.oind, the rarift and c change- rate rule which characterized -the
last two years of the economic program put important constraints on policy-
makers that were in different government offices and managing different
instiumehet-.3. "'Tihi 'ed to:'st'rong inter-agency cotnflicts which were at th-e;
government' level`the reffecition of socialVte'nsions that developed .from-
inappropriate imacro-policies. Because of the dictatorial form by which..
economic policies-;w.ere-desigri4d and± iiiplermented, :these tensions could,not,'6be.
addressed-apprbriiatfely, and -as a consequence'corrective sctions %-ere
(stubbornly) delayed.
The third point is simple but a very important one. The managers, of
a liberalization attempt should ideally be free of the economic interests and
1/ See Canitrot (1979).
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pressures aissociated with highly pr:.tected and inefficient industries. An
important ,:rt of the manufacturing sector is the property of military
industries. Here I show how, by resorting to quantitative restrictions (QRs),
these industries managed to escape the pressures to adjust to increased import
competition that was being imposed on many other industries.
In che final point I stress the importance of institution-building
that should acconmpany a liberal policy reform.
II. Initial Conclitions
During 1975, the Argentine economy was once again suffering the
consequences of populist-protectionist policies. Expansionary government
policies and a reduction in public revenues led ro a fiscal deficit ,hat was
in the neighborhood of 15% of GNP. This implied an increase of 100% from the
1974 figure, and in spite of generalized price controls, the-annual inflation
rate measured by the wholesale price index (WPI) reached a record high cf
192%. I/
'By 1975, the wage-price"agreements-reached-by labor un.ions,and-,
entrepreneurs in 197,3 and enforced by.governmental controls had.broken
apar.. Di Tella, who was a prominent.member of the economic team in 1975,
.Llso gives to inter-sectoral conflicts-~a-centFal role in explaining
_ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~. , .l M;. ,,_ .
intlation: "... The attempt by different-grbup`s- of wcrkers to maintain th2ai
relative position ... were the principal cause 'pf inflation" and ".. Cpch
1/ For this yetar, the consumer price index (CPI) showed an inflation rate of
183%. Recorded wholesale inflation rates during the 70's ha"e been: 1971:
39%; 1972: 77%; 1973: 50%; 1974: 20%; 1975: 192%; 1976: 499%; 1977: 149x;
1978: 146%; 1979: 149%; 1980: 75%.
industry tried to increase the prices of their products through higher import
tariffs and lower tariffs on their imported inputs." (Di Tella, 1983, p.
269). To s great extent, the pub!;: sector deficit was a reflection of the
incapacity of the leadership elite to manage oressures put forward by
different groups.
T'his inflationary trend plus errors in designing and managing
exchange rate policies led to an increasing overvaluation of the domestic
currency. rhe extent of this overvaiuation can be assessed from data
presented in Table 1, whicn shows alternative exchange rate measures (cGlumn 1
through column 8), for the period 1'69-1981. By 1975, and in relation to 1969
(a year for which there is every reason to believe that the exchange rate was
at an appropriate level 1/), the real exchange rat- (column 8) had declined
33X. 2/
T'he currency overvaluation increased excess demand for foreign.
exchange. These press"rzc on foreign exchange markets were initially con-
fronted with traditional methods of drawing down reserves, and also increasing
't-he degree of rest.ri-ctioons,on international' transactions. -In December 1974,--;,
1/- In controlled exchtangee rate economies, it :is impossible,to'know-how close,,
the official rate-,<is'.to the equilibrium-ra'te. Nevertheless, there,ar,e
some eLcments backing the assertion in theZtext. First, a black market -
quotation in'line'with tne official rate -i's-an indication that.no s;gnifi-
cant exccess deriannd on foreign exchange markets was present. ..Second,.per-',
forming a PPP es31uation of the 1969 official :exchange rate using years in,
the early 60s when the exchange rate was floating shows that they ares;
similAr (Nogues,!985). Also note in Table' lthat in 1969 the trade-.-.
balance was very -lose to equilibrium. - -
2/ Alte-natively, using 1969 as the base year, a simple purchAsing power
parity estimat- ;PP) of the exchange rate (column 3) shows that in 1975
this value was 49Z higher than the rate-implicit in import,flows (column
2). See Officer (1976) on PPP exchange rates.
international reserves were US$1.3 billion. One year later, they were down to
US$.6 billion. This was mainly as a consequence of a sharp ircrease in the
trade d-licit, which in 1975 was equivalent to 33% of exports. This deficit
in turn resulted from a significant decline in exports of both traditional
(mainly primary goods), and noai-traditionai (mainly man'ifactured) goods. 1/
As excess demand pressures on foreign exchange mounted, authorities
increased the restrictionist character of the t-ade and payments regime. The
arsenal of controls introduced and/or reinforced at that time included tight
Central Banl. controls on international payments, increased reliance on
quantitative restrictions and import licenses, increased numbers of goods in
lists affected by outright import prohibitions 2/, previous import deposits,
multiple exchange rates, etc, etc.
Controls on domestic capital markers wern equally severe. Peso
denominated deposits were subject to a 100% reserve requiremer.ts and credit
allorations were centrally planned by the Central Bank. Ccntrolled nominal
interest rates resulted in significantly subsidized real interest rates. The
nominal ofi_i;'i savings interest,rate was 17.5% in 1975, which, compares with
an inflation rate of 183t according'to the consumer price indexJ^PI). These
differentiaLs represented a record high.
1/ According to Central Bank statistics the decline was 23% and 29% for,
r-aditional and non-traditionaL expo=rts r'espectively. Nevertheless,
caition should be taken when inteirpreting- official trade statistics in an
economy where the black market 'exchange rate (Table 1, column 4) is
siignificantly different from the official commercial cxchange rdte.
2/ 1'he Cula PrActica del Exportador e Importador (Uifferent issues) include's
a detailed listing of the payments and' irport controls that were
implemented during the Peronist government. Restrictions on international
payments are listed in the Merrnorias Anuales del 'Banco Central.
Not surprisingly, the ratio of M2 to CNP dropped from 25% in 195i t
17% in 1975. This represented a resord low. Quotations in the black market
for foreign exchange soared. On an annual basis this quotation was during
1974, 83X higher than the implicit import rate. During 1975 the average
differential increased to more than 300% (Table 1, columns 2 and 4'1 rhis
came close! to being an historical record that has only been surpassed by trad
and payments distortions observed in the eae,ly 50s. 1/
More generally, black markets of an increasing number of marketable
products also developed rapidly due to the severity of price controls.
Scarrity margins have unfortunately not been documented, but the lengths and
number of the queues that Argentines had to make in order to obtain essential
consumer goods at controlled prices will not be forgotten.
Although not easily documented, it is reasonable to hypothesize tha
problems for obtaining crucial impzorts of intermediate inputs must hive
developed.. Civen that Argentina started its payments problems from a closed
econ-omy positionf,it couldonly cortail importis- that were' alreadyl essentiaL.}
These correspond vith"intermediate "and ca'pital go'ods imports, whi:h,,in.gene,ra
are used in productive processes of the manufacturing sector.
1/ It is also not far ftom being an interns.1onal record. -See-Krueger,,
(1978), Table 6.4, for a cross-country comp.Arisor of black market exchangi
rates, prevailing before a devaluation episode. In this ta'ole, out c' 17
observations, only two presented a greater discroorncy between official
and black market rates than the estimates presented for Argentina.
2/ Imports of consumer goods represented 3.72 and 3.3% of the import bill
during 1974 and 1975 cespectively.
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On the demand side, and in addition to the decline in exports (Tab
1, column 9), real wages stopped rising, 1/ and the unemployment rate began
increasing. Therefore, it might be asserted that both supply bottlenecks an
demand considerations help to e:plain the negative growth rate of -1% observ
during 1975. 2/
IlI. Devaluation Episode
In Late March 1976 the Peronist government which had been
democratically elected was cv-erthrown by a military ccup. 3/ The objective
economic liberalization was emphasized by the new economic minister in his
inaugural cpeech.
Several policies implemented during the initial months aimed in th
direction. First, the process of real devaluation wlhich had started during
the last months of the Peronist government was deepened and on average, the
real excnange rate increased 24% during 1976 (Table 1 column 8). The quick
response of exports ,t'o ti.e higher rea9"e'iang ~rate and reduced rate ofS
1/ According to official statistic- and using the CPI, real wages of un-
skilled workers were 7% higher in 1975 t'han in 1969, and did not change
relation to 1974 (Table 2).
2/ The corresponding rate for the manufacturing sector was -3%.
3/ In this month the WPI inflation rate reached an historic mark of 54%.
export taxation allowed a fast reduction of exchange ccntrols. 1/ Also, the
differentials among the relevant multiple exchange rates were gradualLy
reduced, and in Decembcr of 1976 the Central Bank implemented a unified
exchange rate regime.
Pa:tial dismantling of qu;tnritative restrictions on imports was als
undertaken. -his, to a graac extent, represented A reduction in the number o
goods on the import list aff..cted by outright import prohibitions which, as
said, were part of the policy package designed to cope with balance of
payments problems during 1975. 2/
The gradual liberalization of the payments regime was accompanied b
almost total removal of price controls in domestic markets. The decision,
given the severity of the controls, cannot be sufficiently emphasized.
All this helped to restore the confidence on the rnarket mechanism
which had been se-erely damaged. D'rhaps, because of this initial move, many
observers h'ave characterized economic policies cf the military regime as bti..
liberal. In 'what follows, I show evitdence'that casts serious .doubts on,the
extent to which Arge'ntine economic polici'estdureing these -years cdan.be.
classified as Liberal. In essence, the stagnant behavior of the economy afte
'S.,
1976 and thiefai-ure of the new econromi"xpolicies must be attributed&d tdhe_
pe:vas ve effects of inappropriate-'government:`controls.
1/ See Memorias Anuales del Banco Central. 'Some of the increase inlrecorded
exports could be attributed to lower margins of underinvoicing-as gxport
taxes were being reduced and the difference between the black-market an'
the official exchange rate was narrowing.
2/ It is-important to stress, that these initial charges did not represenit a
significant departure from the structure of QRs that had characterized th
Argentine economy since at least the early 60s. in particular,;'as will t
discussed, the regime of import licenses was not modified.
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IV. The Changing Nature of Macroeconomic Conrrols 1/
I. Introduction
Ihe Economic- Minister that came to power in March of 1976 concluded
his administration in March 1981, when the President was also changed. For
analytical purpooes, it is useful to divide this period into two subperiods.
,te first exr'!nds from March 1976 to the end of 1978. I call this the unanti-
cipated period, because in relation to .he second period. economic policies
were highly unpredictable, and not announced in advance. The second period
extends from the end of 1978 to March 1981. This is the period when exchange
rate and tariff policies wece realnr3unced, and I have therefore labeled it
the preannounced period.
2. The unanticipated period: 1976-1978
2.1. Wage policy
From 1976 to late 1978, there; existed,at different points in- ti
severe controls on onse or more of the followirng variables: wages, intercs'r,
rates, pricesdand -probably the most irnportantof them all, .on the exchange,.,
rate.
Initially after the coup, the decision zo liberalize domestic.
markets and eliminate the regime of price controls was accompanied by the
imposition of'severe wage controls. According to official statistics, during.
1/ Since this paper was ccmp1eted in late 1983, several articles analyzing
the economic policies and economic performance of the milicary regi' mh:c
been published. These include among others Calvo (1985), Dornbusch
(1984), and Fischer et. al. (1984).
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1976 these controls resulted in a record reduction of real wages that for
relatively unskilled workers was 49% in relation to 1975 (Table 2). These
wage controls pu; the real wage well below historical levels.
After the wage freeze had been imposed, tt.e monthly inflation rate
measured with the CPI which hall reached a record high of 38% in March of ::976
showed the following trend: 34% in Ar.ril, 12% in May, and 3% in June. G:.ven
that price controls had by then been eliminated and a process of re&l
devaluation was taking place, it is difficult to explain such a drastic
reduction in the inflation rate without relating it to the wage freeze.
The wage freeze distorted the underlying trend inflation rate for a
short time. This in turn confused policymakers, and the subsequient rebound of
inflation was taken by =any 29 a first failure of the e-^ncmic team to
stabilize the price level. This then led policymakers to implement new
controls. This experience therefore suggests that, in addition to the well-
known negative economic effects of wtge controls, maintaining relatively free
labor markets during a stebilization attempt would have provided,more accurate
t
signals t~o p0 i'cyi'akers regarding the' cacroecsonomic'impact 'of the iwv.t. bf,'.
policies.
Why, ve're'wage'controls imp e'dX$)i p6 p7lar 'nypothesis has linked ;
these controls to government objectives.regarding unemployment. The social
- 12 -
and political tensions of that time 1/ should not, according to a hypothesized
official view, be permitted to increase. It was feared that iafur unrest
could be triggered by increased unemployment. Therefore, reducing real wages
while at the same time maintaining high legal layoff costs, would help to hold
employnent levels and keep the unemployment rate low. 2/
An alternative but non-conflicting hypothesis is that just as price
controLs had been used by the previous government, the new economic adminis-
tration resorted to wage controls as an anti-inflation device. If so, the
cotnclusion is that the 2hift in the struczure of political power led the
government to change the group whose economic behavior was directly
controlled.
The wage freeze was gradually relaxed and apparently was net binding
after 1977. 3/ Nevertheless, while the labor market was gradually freed from
1/ It is important to recall that strong labor unions and the leadership
which they held within the labor movement provided the main political base
of the'Perohist-government. Therefore, the power of labor union teaders;
-gaiined' momentum'Aduring these -ears'.. Ce-rt4aitnly one of the political"'
otjectives q.f.theicoup was to break the porirtical and economic_power'ot
these unions. The'leaders that could. not' escape were imprisoneai without'
trial for years. Alsc, the econooixc activities of these unions were -
-'termina'tetl..
2/ The implicit. assuimpt'ion regarding sociall-~behavior is that labor unrest
would not'develop'from low wages.' This, in fact, occurred but'9e 'reason
is to a great extent also related to the'repression that was taking place"'
al: that time. Official statistics show that the open unemploymentrate in
the major industrial areas declined during 1976. In Cran Buenos Aires, U
Cordoba and Rosario, the open unemployment rates declined from 4.8'%, ,6.51-
and 5.32 in April to 4.1%, 5.4%, and 2.61 in October. On the 6ther hand','
maanufacturing output declined between the last quarter of 1975' and the'`'
first quarter of 1976. The behavior of these variables is in'line wi'th
the hypothesized expectation of government officials in regard to the
effects that the wage freeze would have bn employment levels.
3/ See, for example, Meier et al (1977).
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direct government interferences, significant taxes on wages were maintained
during practically che whole period. Elsewhere I have shown that in 1973 the
implicit tax rate on wages was equivalent to 22% of gross wages. 1/ These
distortions, which had grown during the initial months of the Peronist regime,
were only reduced towards the end of 1980 when the collapse of the economic
program was evident. 2/ Clearly from a resource-allocational poinLt of view,
it would have been preferable to reduce labor costs by reducing these taxes as
an alternative to having frozen wages. 3/
2.2. Price contrels
As said, after June 1976 the inflation rate began increasing and
according to the 'IPI reached a monthly rate of 14% in January 1977. This led
policymakers to reintroduce price controls which, as said, had been abolished
in the early months following the coup. These controls were implemented from
February - less than a year from the date they.had last been abolished,- to
July 1977. They were rigorously enforced with relatively big,enterprises,in,
the manuf'acturi'ng sector. While these controls were lifted in Juey:nd.'eere,
not reintroduced thereafter, they clearly compounded the negative economic
,effects of- the,wage freeze. Summing u4p:, .b;een,t4976 and 1977 the military,
governrment introduced severe wage and priceb'on,tirols.
1/ Nogues (1985).
2/ A reform of the value added tax (VAT) was implemented in October of
1980.. Along with this reform several taAes on wages were eliminated.
3/ Obviously, together with this p^licy sh.ft, other less distortionary taxes
and/or reduced government spending measures should be implemented. -
- 14 -
2.3. Interest race policies, capital inflows and exchange rate control
By the end of 1976 the process of exchange rate unification and real
devaluation had been completed. Following liberslization of exchange
controls, the Central Bank implemented a monetary reforra. The regime of 100%
reserve .equirements for peso depojits, direct credit allocation and
controlled interest rates was substituted by one of fractionary minimum
reserve require-ents in a context of nearly complete freedom of interest
rates. 1/ It is of interest to emphasize that this financial liberalization
was introduced at the same time when wage-price controls were enforced. It is
difficult to rationalize this inconsistent pouliy behavior.
Real interest rates increased significantly (Table 2). These
interest rates, coupled with the liberalization of the capital account of the
balence of.pitymenti fueled short-term capital inflows, which together with
positive trade balances, increased foreign exchange reserves. These reserves
went from US$1.8 billion in 1976 to US$4.0 and US$o.O billion in December 1977
e.Jn 1978 respec'tevely.
Probably'bbe'cause the inflat,ion rate continued to be high-in.,a
situation of increasint foreign exchange rerervei and trade balance surpluees,,
economic aiuthoritga.s%jed 'by the Central Bank,,4decided to reduce the rate,of`"
devaluatir)n dir.ing119'78. This policy was not announced in advance, and
ii It is usually overlooked that interest rates for financing non-traditional
exports were never eliminated. This control implied high interest rate
subsidies per peno exported. (Nogu4s 1983).
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implied a ralical departure from the policy followed during 1977 of
maintaining relatively constant the real exchange rate. 1/
As seen in Table 1 (column B), the real exchange rate dropped 14%
during 1978. In addition to its effects on the price level, another objective
of the new exchange rate policy during 1978 was to create exchange rate
uncertainty. It was thought at the Central Bank, that this uncertainty would
reduce incentives to capital inflows due to the high level of domestic
interest rates.
IL should be stressed, and this is important to emphasize in order
to understand what was going on, that instability in the rates of
minidevaluation was a policy favored by the strong beliefs held by Central
Bank decisionrmakers regarding the lack of effectiveness of direct controls on
capital movements. 2/ Clearly an important dilemma was being faced at that
time by policymakers in the Central Bank. They perceived capital inflows as
being inflationary, and financial controls to be ineffective. Unfortunately,
such 'i priori thoughts which help to understand the nature of policies
implemented during 1979-81 have been'very cost,ly,. I now turn,to a bridf
description of: these policies.
1/ By then, Argentina had repaid its loans-to the IMF.
2/ For examiple, Arriaz6a (1983), has asserted that: "...It is possible that
for some countries the answer (to the question of whetber capital move-
mernts can be controLlecl) would be positive but in wy opinic- n.^t for
Argentina...."
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3. Thu pr.t:nncunced period: 1979-1981
As said, after the iiberalization of nominal interest rates in June
of 1977, real interest rates remained abnormally high during 1978 (Table 2).
Unfortunately, the level of interest rates during this period remains as yet
one of the most important unexplained effects of the economic program. It is
true that not all barriers to international capital movements had been
lifted. But ilt is dtub:.ful that thuse remaining could go a long way in
explaining the difference between domestic and international interest rates,
in presence of high mobility of short-run financial capital. Part of the
explanation of high real interest rateSs must be attributed to government
deficits, which as a proportion of CDP were 3.20% and 3.75% during 1977 and
1978 respectively. These deficits were financed by borrowing.
z hbothesized view suggests that preannouncement of the future
path of the exchange rate was seen as the solution to several economic
problems;. 1/ First, preannouncement of a declining rate of devaluation would
dampen inflationary expectations, thus, helping to impart a downward trend on
the rate!of,inflation. It was also thought that preannouncement-would:,reduce 
uncertainties associated with a nianaged exchange rate policy and rherefore, -
help to reduce re'al interest rates.
This implied another radical- departure fror, points of view,thati,the,
same policymakers had held in previous months.. Policymakers, I hypot.hesize,y%
concluded that 1978 exchange rate uncertainty, had negative-effectd on,;resl,
1/ Preannounzement of the future price of the exchange rate was also
accompanied by similar announcements of minimum wages and prices of,goods
and services supplied by public enterprises.
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domestic interest rates, and they decided to ch2nge exchange rate policy once
again. Preannouncement was thought to provide certeinty thus helping to
reduce real rates of interest and dampen inflationary expectations.
Policymakers in the Central Bank were, therefore, expecting that
prearnouncement of the exchange rate path would be the instrument by which
they would achieve the double goal of reducing the inflation And real interest
rates. 1/
Between Januaty 1979 and March 1981 when this policy was fortunately
discontinued, and contrary to pc:icymaker's expectaticns, domestic prices had
not converged to international inflation plus devaluation. Estimates of the
discrepancies between these two seri.:s are presented in Table 3. Even in the
last quarter of 1980 the inflation rate, as measured by the U2I, continued to
increase - although at a declining rate - in spite of reductions in both
internetional inflation and the rate of-devaluation. Table 3 shows that
between the iirst quarter of 1979 and the last quartcr of 1980, domestic
accumulated inflation had reached 260Z. In contrast, international inflation
plus-dE'valuation' summed 134Z,-during th4e:1samepetiod. 2.1' The resultrwas 'a
1/ The methodology used for determ'ning the preannounced rates of,devaluation
is 'resented in ArriazSi (1983).'
2/ Later, I present some hypothesis which explain this lack of convergence.
These hyporhesis refer mainly to the characteristics of the structure of
protection that accompanied the stabilization package.
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significant drop in the real exchange rate of 311 between 1978 and 1980 (Table
1 column 8). 1/
The objective. of r-ducin3 the real interest rate was psrtially
achieved during 1979 (Table 2). Nevertheless, by the end of the year the real
exchange rate coupled with lower import barriers, triggered an upsurge in
imports. In current dollars duri.ag 1980 these were up 57% from 1979, and the
trade deficit reached a record high level of $2.5 billion. This represented
31% of that: year's exports. This percentage is in the same order of magnitude
as that observed in the crisis year of 1975, just before the military
government came to power.
Rleal interest rate3 increased pari passu with the increased
uncertainty regarding ti:e maintenance of exchange rate policy. In turn, high
interest rates and the elimination of the relatively minor contrc7s on capital
flows that were still in effect in July 1980 2/ attracted additional short-
term capit,dl inflo-is.
But the social profitability of these capital inflows has been
negative. For domestic residents, it was obviou's that. the; '980 real exchange
rate was unsustainable. 'Therefore, these rsidnts decided to increase their
holdings of foreign exchange, and,eventually send an important.portion,of
1! nte role played by persistent fiscal deficits and capital inflows in-
expiZining this currency overvaluation is discussed in Corbo et. al.
(1985).
2/ Essentially a one year rinimuv maturity period.
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these abroad. 1/ This process was financed by foreign banks who at that
time, overlooked basic indicators that were signalling iuture balance of
payments problems to Argentina. The inte national financial community was
expecting to reap important profits from Argentina's high reAl intere3t rates,
when in fact, the level of these rates were to a great extent the consequence
of disequilibrium exchange rates. Clearly, the international financial
community nsde serious judgmental errors regarding the medium term repaymerit
ability of Argentina.
The consequencc of disequilibrium macroeconomic policies and of the
international ''nancial community overlooking these policies has been a
tremend:us jump in Argentina's foreign debt. ihis debt increased from US$5.6
billion in 1971 to US$37.0 billion in 1981. Solutions to the consequences of
macro-policy errors of the magnitude that has been pointed have not yet been
found. For the time Leing, the Lurden of Argentina's policy mistakes is lying
exclusively on this country's future generations.
I hope that the material presentee in the previous discussion puts
some doubt on those who might still think that Argentina's macroeconomic
policies during 1976-'1981 were liberal'in a meaningful economi: interpretation
of the word. In the inappropriate macroeconomic setting which I have
described, sorme trade liberalization!pbl'cies. were implemented. Nevertheless,
when viewed in a broaci context, these policies had numerous errors, and the
next section io an attempt to point out some ofjthem.
1/ The relation between Argentina's exchange rate policies and capital
flights has beer. studied by Cuddington-(1985). See also Dornbusch.
(1984).
V. A uLantitative Assearment of Trade Liberalization.
1. Indicators of trade liberalization
Ideally, a dynamic evaluation of the extent of trade liberalization
could be approximated empirically by time series estimates of nominal and
effective rates of protection. But because careful estimates of these
vars..bles are expensive and time-consuming, they are usually not available.
At least, this is the case in the Argentine economy.
In this section, I will assess approximately the extent Or trade
liberalization by analyzing the behavior of effective exchange rates. 1/ For
ease of exposition, I define the following four cdtegories of effective
exchange rates 2/ (EERs):
EERis corresponds tc import-subsritute industries
EER. corresponds to non-conpetitive importsfcimp
EER te corresponds to traditional exports
EER -t orr esponds to non-traditional exports
A typical import substitution (IS) country is characterized by the
following escalation of EER,:
>-nt,e', ,rimp -^te
1/ The! effective exchange rare on any given product is defined as the,nomina,l,,
exchange rate times one plus (minus) the ad-valorem tariff ,quivalent of
all taxes levied un it before it is landed'(exported) into (from) the,
country.
2/ J3i.ng only four categories of goods does not allow a close examination of
the variance of incentives that typically characterize import-substitution
economies. Nevertheless, some comments in this. respect will-be made.
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In *ords: the EER provided to IS industries for their sales in the domestic
market (EERi ) is higher than that provided for its export sales (EERnte), I/
which in turn is in general higher than the effective exchange rate applied on
imports of :nterrnediate inputs and capital goods not domestically preauced
(EERimp ). 21 Finally, this last rate is in turn higher than that r,.ceived by
exporters of traditional goods (EERte) which in general are taxed.
A necessary condition for there to be trade liberalization is to
observe a reduction in the difference between EERi5 and EERtet as a
consequence of both a reduction in EERi. and an increase of EERtES. On the
euport side, it is also important to observe a reduction in the difference
between EE.Rnte and EER te'
2. Export barriers and effective exchange rates on exports
Several major changes of export trade policies were introduced. In
the first place, in early 1976, the rates of export taration on traditional
exports wr:re extremely high. Major grains were affected by export tax rates
in the neighborhood of 50%. The corresponding rate for wool was 33Z, while
- thsit of meat was'l2'1'V"3/
Duri'ng'l'ate1976 ane 1977, the rates>off export taxation were reduced,
drasticalty exceptif-or'Qmeat. In pa'ticuliiV,the _rates applied,on major. grains,
were reduced to 16i- ini977 and to'5-6I thereatter. Tax rates on,exports ma'de
l/ In protectionist countries such as Argentina;! the height of export,
incentives for non-traditional exports isjl,ower than the height of,import.
protection for domestic sales.
2/ In many cases, these ii.ports enter duty free or pay a very low tariff.
3/ Export tax rates increased significantly as the fiscal ,deficit soared
during the latest period of the Peronist government.
- 22 -
by exportable manufacturing industries were also reduced. For example, tax
rates on exports of vegetable oils were reduced from values ranging from 48%
in 1975 to 3% in 1977. Processed meats, hides, and wool were also affected by
significant reductions in export taxes.
Therefore, agriculture and exportable manufacturing industries
received the full impact of real devaluation. The resulting increase in real
effective exchange rates was particularly high for these sectors because of
the elimination of the multiple exchange rate regime, and the reductions in
rates of export taxa'Lon.
Between 1975 and 1977 the real exchange rate (defined as the nominal
exchange rate deflated by the WPI) increased 29Z (Table 1, column 7). In
contrast, the price-level-deflated EER (PLD-EER) of the primary sector
increased more than 60% except for meat, and that of manufactured exportables
by 39% (Table 4).
On the other hand, PLD-EERs of non-traditional exports increased
during the same pcriod only 9%. Nevertheless, these estimates do not
-1 ,..... - .. .. .. .-,,  .i ............................... . . . . . . . . . . . ................................................................... ,- 
incorporate interest rate subsidies forthcomi'ng'ffrom credit lines,granted by,,
the Central Batik for export financing. I have. estimated elsewhere (Nogues
1983) that for,4.the great majority of non-.traditional exports, "potential,
interest rate subsidies per peso exported-wer'e iot higher than 20%.-
Therefore, it'can be con.luded that fiscal and.financial export policies.
initially implied a reduction in the bias between incentives.granted,to,! 
dif'ferent types of exports. Export policies were therefore initially moving
in the right direction.
After 1977, PLD-EERs for exports closely followed the path-of the
retal exchange rate. Letting 1976, the devaluation year, take a value of 100,
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by 1978 th,e PLD-EERs of meat and exportable manufacturing industries had
dropped to 60 and 62 respectively (Table 4). Except for grains, where export
taxes were! further lowered during this year, reductions of PLD-EERs were also
considerable in other exportable industries.
I know of no other experience that in such a short time-span has
gore through such drastic changes in real incentives. 1/
The Argentine experience is in this regard quite unique. Removal of
export barri.,: and real devaluation led to trade surpluses. While the
country did en.gage in some external borrowing, this was more the result of
market forces than of government efforts to rebuild foreign exchange
reserves. While other countries reducing trade barriers initially had to
borrow externally, Argentina could have done for some time without additional
borrowing. By the end of 1977 policymakers had an important decision to
make. In order to achieve a trade balance they could either appreciate the
domestic currency, 2/ or alternatively, dismantle import barriers more
rapidly. As said, policymakers chose the first alternative. The failure to
initially liberal'ize -imports 'is central to the- explanation of the collapse,of
the program at' &4;au'ir stage. --If 'i'mports;ha'd- ben liberalized faster, foreign
exchange reserves would not have increased-as fast, and therefore, so the
1/ Krueger (1978) analyzes the behavior-of PLD-EER (Table 5.3) for ten.-
different countries in twenty-two'different devaluation episodes. In,that
sample there is not one single casetof'reduction in PLD-EERs within
adjacent two years from the time of devaluation such as the extreme,ones,
observed in Argentina.
2/ Some economists argue that the dismantling of export barriers and
liberalization of the capital account implied a lower exchange rate than
that observed in 1977. Sjaastad and Rodriguez (1979).
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hypothesis goes, policymakers would have been less inclined to follow real
appreciation policies.
The further deterioration of the real exchange rate that followed
preant.ouncement of this variable after 1979 was accompanied closely by similar
reductions of PLD-EERs. Table 4 shows that by 1919 the PLD-EERs of all export
categories were lower than the value observed in the crisis year of 1975i It
might be concluded that the price effects of export liberalization and
devaluation that took place during 1976 and 1977 had been eliminated by
currency overvaluation as early as 1979. Unfortunately, effective exchange
rates continued declining in 1980.
3. Tariff policy and price divergence in import-substitute industries
If all goods in the economy were tradables it would be impossible to
observe in the long run significant diversions of domestic from international
prices adjusted by the exchange rate. If commodity arDitrage takes place
through competitive markets, the duration of whatever discrepancy might appear
would he a`'unih'cco'' of' the duratibn'of-thela,bitrage process.,
Table 3.shows' that during the period,when the exchange rate,was
preannounced, the change in domestic prices did not equal the;,s*tm of,deva,lua-,-
tio&plus- in'tern'ational inflation. 1/ E a -in_the last quarter ,of ,1980when -,
the rate of devaluation and internationatlinflation were decreasing, domest,ic
inflation was still increasing. The puzzle islstill more astonishing.when
account is taken of the fact that import 'tariffs were declining, and also-that,
1/ 1'he economic program lasted until March 1981. Nevertheless, an unexpected
10% devaluation was made in February of t!at year, so in essence-the
program ended in January 1981.
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commodities included in the WPI are tradables in the traditional definition of
not being protected by prohibitive transport cost barriers. Table 5 shows
that price divergence was most pronnounced in importable goods.
Broadly speaking, there are three hypotheses explaining why there
was such a difference between actual price behavior and the one forecasted by
the exchange rate rule. 1/ The first hypothesis of why prices behaved
sluggishly points to the existence of lags and market imperfections that do
not-disappear rapidly, even after an important reduction of import barriers
has been implemented. The second hypothesis is based on the credibility that
agents put on the economic program and the economic behavior that this
credibility might have triggered. Finally, a third non-conflicting hypothesis
is that import barriers were not reduced that much, and that, therefore, there
never existed a generalized potential threat to domestic producers of
competitive imports. I comment briefly on each of these hypotheses.
The first hypothesis is built from different lines of reasoning.
First, there are some ad hoc stories that stress the existence of lags in the
arbitrage pr;. ss. There is first a lag until agents realize that ,profits can
'be made-by engaging in initernatibnal-"commodity -arbitrage activities. A second,
lag is explained by the duration of the search process through which the
would-be impovte'r, mu'st go. Recall that in 'a typical iimport substitution
economy, a great -majority of goods, and particularly consumer, goods, have not
1/ To the extent that capital inflows and fiscal deficits increasead the.
relative price of non-tradable, some oiscrepancy between the price
behavior of domestic import-competing and imported goods wouled have been
observed anyhow (see Corbo et. al. 1985). The discussion that follows
analyses other reasons for the discrepancy between domestic and inter-
national prices of importable goods.
- vso -
been introduced to the country for decades. It is therefore not obvious at
the beginning of the liberaLization episode which goods to introduce and which
foreign suppliers to approach.
Closely related stories also haie some appeal for other types of
goods. In particular, in an I-S economy, the bulk of imports are non-
competing. These usually include intermediate imports and capital goods.
These imports are generally made by the sane enterprises that use them in the
productive process. For our purposes, this implies that initially the economy
is characterized by the lack of importers-wholesalers who presumably would act
promptly when opportunities for profit from importing appear.
This hypothesis suggests that liberalization attempts cf I-S
economies must face rigidities and imperfections of the price mechanism, which
can be attributed to the nature of I-S policies and the structural economi'
charqcteristics that result from such poliies, and which do not disappear
rapidly when import liberalization occurs.
A second hypothesis for explaining price divergence is related-to
the degree of agents' confidence in policies. We have already presented
evidence on the uncertainty that surrounded policymaking and,implementation.,
In I-S countries in general and Argentina in particular, the greatest-macro-
--uincertainty hai historically originated from instability of;the real,excNhange:
rate. It,is reasonable to hypothesize, that unless agents were,shortTsighted,
from past history they would have forecasted a-high likelihood of_ being,again
subjected to exchange rate variability. 1/ In this environment, agents would
have second thoughts before investing heavily in international tradable
activities. T'his being tthe case, chances are that the international price
arbitrage process could be severely impaired when economic policies are not
credible. I have pointed above to several characteristics of policy reforms
which suggest that this lack of credibility might have characterized agents'
expectations during these years.
The above problems and explanations of dynamic price divergence are
independent of the existence of water in the tariff. 2/ On the other hand,
the generalized existence of tariff redundancy and the absence of competitive
imports provides an additional explanation for the lack of convergence of
domestic to international prices. In presence of water in the tariff, there
is no reascn why changes in domestic prices should follow changes in tariff
rates, or for that matter, chdnges in the exchange rate. This explanation is
independent of market structures and credibility factors and therefore
reinforces the above explanacions.
1/ As seen, the' real exchange rate declined all'along the period of
preannouncement.- This continued the.trend thAt had already started in
1978, and therefore it is reasonable to hypothesize that agents were_-
already in early 1979 forecasting an exchange rate crisis. See.Kaminsky
(1983) for an econometric analysis showing that agents did not believe in
the maintenance of the Central Ban- preannouncement of the exchlange
rate. See also Dornbusch (1984).
2/ There is water in the tariff or tariff redundancy when the value of the
legal tariff rate is higher than the value that makes competitive imports
prohibitive.
I will now describe critically tariff policy and comment on the
magnitude of tariff rcdundancy. 1/ The record on dismantling import barriers
shows that the first and unexpected move was mrade in November 1976, i.e., six
months after the new government had taken power. Even though the new tariff
structure was still highly escalated, 2/ the most significant change made in
this oc:asion was in regard to maximu.n rates, which was reduced from values
that were higher than 200% to a new maximum of 100%. 3/
These rates correspond generally to consumer goods. Nevertheless,
the impact of these changes was not reflected in the structure of imports.
The percentage participation of consumers goods in the import bill was still
very low during 1977. 4/
Thi; was to some extent, as I will show, the consequence of the
generalized e4istence of redundant protection, i.e., water in the tari'f.
This observation, coupled with the relatively high value of the real exchange
rate makes it very doubtful to assert that-t-his initial move had any
significant iripact on competitive imports, and therefore on domestic producers
of protected goods. In any case, this was the first but also the last
,unexpected moye.* Afte'r this the government moved extremelyt.cautiously. .
:Up t.o,December: 1978 - more than 'two2-years after the first tariff -
reform- severaL_.part,i.al_tariff changes took place. These reforms were-
negoLiated 'directly rb:y,the Secr,tary of Cominerce'with representatives-of.
differenlt industries. My own estimates,' and what I have been told of how-
1/ Also, the nexc section will show that import licenses were never totally
dissmantled.
2/ Berlinski (1978) for some estimates.
3/ This initial tariff reform was not accompanied by any major move of
lifting very protective quantitative restrictions.
4! The participatisn rate increaied from 2.1% in 1976 to 3.3% in 1977.
these negotiations took place, show that the net result of all these partial
tariff reforms was a reduction in the degree of redundant protection.
The Secrctary of Commerce used these partial tariff reforms to put
pressures on protected entrepreneurs to limit price increases, and tar;ff
reductions were negotiated with this objective in mind. This was a sig.-.L
showing that thc tariff was being used as a stabilization instrument. The
result of these numerous partial tariff negotiations was not only a reduction
in the margins of tariff redundancy, but also an increase in the variance of
the legal tariff structure.
As to the quantitative estimates backing my assertions, I have
measuired elsewhere the average tariff redundancy. 1/ Table 6 reproduces some
of my earlier findings. These estimates compare legal tariff structures with
the percentage price differentials between domestically produced and foreign
CIF prices. The price differentials were estimated for February of 1977. The
legaL tariff structures correspond to October 1976 (before tariff reforms had
started) and December 1977 (after the Secretary of Commerce had completed the
bulk of partial tariff reforms). These estimates show that on average the
rati'o of,legal tnriffs to price,di1ferent-ia'Is'declined from 2.5 to 1.4 betw,een,
October, 1976 and.December 1?7-7. 2
1/ Nogu6s, 1 9 1,8).
2/ Legal tariffs and price differeni:al's `are' weighed by gross value of
production. The reader might be puzzled. b'y the relatively low level, of
protection that comes from the estimates,of price differentials., A.couple
of comrnents are in order. First, th'e i:high' real exchange rate during 1977
reduced these differentials. Also, as argued, the severe wage controls in,
effect at that time kept the domestic price level relatively'low. These,
comments imply that in a less controlled environment, price differentials
might have been higher and, therefore,'ou'r estimates of water in the
tariff would have been lower.
Also, the rank correlation coefficient between price differentials
and legal tarifis observed in October 1976 was -6%. If, ir.stead, price
differentials are compared with the structure of legal tariffs of December,
1977, the correlation coefficient takes a value of 56Z. 1/ Clear1y,
therefore, the structure of legal tariffs moved more in line with the
structure of relative prices observed in a set of industries producing goods
that were at that time protected from international competition. Because the
variability _f price differentials was initially higher than the variability
of the tariff structure, the implementatiorn of partial tariff reforms implied
an increase in the variability of legal tariffs. Therefore, the role
attributed to tariff policies during the first two and a half years of
military government were quite different from the role of resource allocation
and import competition that economists usually attribute to them.
In practice, it took nearly three years for the economic team to
formulate and implement a relatively more consistent tariff policy. Such a
policy was announced in December 1978. Several characteristics of the reform
should be stressed. First, this was a gradual preannounced quarterly
reduction of-legal tar'if'fs to be implemented.during five years, i.e.v-wel;
after'the government :'iactuiIIy starting the refo'irmwas scheduled at tha't c7ime,
to-end its term.- Also,;the 'rates of tariff ,reductions were-initially.low, and&
accelerated in the la"st years. Table 7 sho,w's 'tihe structure of legal tariffs
prevailing at the beginning of the program, and-the proportional reductions
scheduled to go into effect up to 1981 and from here to 1984. It is clear
1/ Statistically significar.t with a 5% confidence level.
that if the tariff reform was going to be implemented, the burden of the
implementation costs was passed over to the next government.
In the second place, the target and interim tariff structure had an
escalation not very different from the historical one. Simulation analysis
presented in FIEL (1980) shows that with the target tariff structure, the
level of ERPs computed from legal tariff rates was high and variable. 1/
One important question to raise at this stage is why it took so long
to design the tariff program just described. One simple answer is that
policymulkers were concerned with the transition costs associated with the
implementation of import liberalization policies. This might be part of the
answer but is not compatible with policymaker's behavior in other areas. An
alternative hypothesis and one that is more consistent with the nature of
policymaking that has been described, is that tariff policy was essentially
geared by anti-inflation objectives. In fact this role was legally built into
tariff policy onfy four days after the preannounced tariff schedule was
implementedl In fact, Resolution 6/79 of the Ministry on Economy gave power
to the Secretary of Commerce to apply tariff reductions on products whose
monthly rate of price increase' exceeded.the- preannounced rate of devaluation.
Fol'lowing the guidelines of 'this',;res lution numerous tariff,
reductions were implemented. This obviouslyj,exacerbated entrepreneurs, at a
time'when, because of the overvaluati'on of'tRe peso, conmpetitive imports;vwere
beginning to growvrapidly. Even though)import%,v.introduced as a consequence of
the application of Resolution 6 v-re not of magnitude, the associated uncer-
1/ These estimates for 45 manufacturing sectors show a simple average ERP of
432:.
tainties accompanying these tariff redjctions must have produced negative
economic effects. The uncertainty came 3imply from the fact that after
Resolution 6, the confidence of the entrepreneurs on the extent to which the
preannounced tariff schedule was going to apply to their productive process
had been severely reduced.
The tariff was also thought as an instrument to foster investment
and technological change. Here there are two pieces of evidence. First, in
the preliminary remarks of Resolution 1634/78 that implemented the program of
quarterly tarif'f reductions, it is said that "...as an ezception, and wiLh the
objective of facilitating the acquisition of industrial equipment, capital
goods imports not domestically produced will be allowed duty free during
1979." 1/
Second, tariff protection to domestic producers of capital goods was
drastically chtinged four months after the policy of preannounced tariff reduc-
tions had started. 2/ The new tariffs applied on these goods was equal to the
one that had initially been scheduled to go into effect in January 1984.
Given that the rest of the tariff program remained unchanged, and that as we
shall see the basic metals industries continiued to be highly protected, this
policy shift icmplied a drast'i'c and unexpected reduction of effectiyeprotec--
-tion to producers of these-goods. 3/
If anyone did believe in the polic7-of-preannounced tariff.
1/ Author's translation.
2/ Resolution 493/79.
3/ Simulation of the effect of these policies on ERP is presented in FIEL
(1980).
reductions when it: was first implemented, this lack of stability uf import
policies, associated with the inappropriate roles assigned to the tariff in
general, and in particular its anti-inflationary objectives, must have
affected seriously the credibility of the whole program. The growing
overvaluation of the domestic currency that was taking place must have
reinforced agents' expectations that the whole economic prograrm was going to
be running into incressing difficulties.
The extent .o which tariff redundancy affected the behavior of
domestic prices in late 1979 and 1980 cannot be accurately assessed from this
data. Thie evidence suggests that in some cases this might have provided at
least part of the explanation of price divergence in Argentina. 1/
Finally, it is of interest to note that the failure to dismantle
some signiEicant QRs during the liberalization attempt also helps to explain
the lack of convergence of docaestic price changes to international inflation
plus devaluation. This will be discussed more carefully in the next section,
where r take up some political-economy considerations.
VI.i Some Political-Economy Considerations
The earlier sections have attempted to tackle with one of the-
traditional tasks of economists: i.e. to analyze the appropriateness of
economic policies. But societies do not determine their policie-s by reference-
ta the costs and-Ibenefits that have convinced many economists. Trade and
exchange rate poLicies are the result of the _underlying political
institutional characteristics of societies.
1/ See MHichinea (1983).
In this section I stress some issues of the political-economy of
trade and exchange rate policies. Point I calls attention to the fact' that
traditionally in Argentina exchange rate policies have been shaped by income-
distribution effects. This is in sharp con-rasE to the role that the exchange
rate plays in monetary and neoclassical models. These models, it has been
argued, are the ones that policymakers had in their minds during 1976-1981.
The point here is to emphasize that des?ite the very different roles that the
exchange rate plays in these abstract models, there has been a pervasive
tendency of the policy decision-mechanism to use the exchang',- . as anti-
inflation instrument. The lesron to extrect from this is clear an'd
straightforward: until we are not sure that t-. political-economy understands
the central role that the excnange rare and the tariff plays in the long-run
resource allocation characteristics of the economy, there will be a real
danger of implementing trade liberalization policies in an inflationary
economy. Indend, the Argentine experience suggests thit for policymakers
these instruments might be used sooner or later for stabilization purposes
with costly consequences.
- A second consideration refers to the fact that traditionally,-dif-
ferent government- agencxtes manage -different .trade instruments. - But because of-
the nature and relative importance of different controls, some goveriment
agenc'ies - che -fol'ovews .- 'adjust. the iitriument'sl they'control- to cope -wit:h,
the effects of firianacial and exchange rate policie's implemented'by the leeXding
agencies. This agency segment&tion was not changed during the period under -
study and because of this, inter-agency disputes developed. This argum:La_ is-
developed in point. 2.
The role of the military and the economic interest they held as
ovners of very inefficient and key industrial sectors producing intermediate
goods mwles it quite unlikely that governments under their influence w.11
..ctempt Across-the-board liberalizatioo poLicies. Point 3 argues that the
made-tc-measure protection to the military-industrial complex during this
period is clear evidence on this hypothesis.
The final point stresses the importance tna, new institutions are
expected to play when policy reform3 in effect give competitive forces a
greater role in the resource allocation process.
1. Exchange rate views and policies
Many acholars have concluded that irgentir.a is a sectoralized
society. 1/ A Lalor charac.erization of this sectoralization would include s
rural-jrban d;.chotomy. A summary view of the underlying political-economy
concludes that because Argentina is a resource-rich country, it is reasoniable
to redistribute income from the rural to the growing urban sector., Also,
because land o-wnership is very concentrated,. such a redistribution is
eq u i1 b le.-
In this irt..r-sectoral struggle, some' powerful urban groups have
shown.great1p6iiticsl ability to organz hemselves. These groups which
could be classified as the winners fr r the distorted ecoAomy would include a
handful of strong Rnd powerful labor unions on the one hand, and a few-mono-
1/ See among others, Brodershon (1963), Canitrot (1979), Di Tella (1983), an
MalLon & Sourrouille (1973). Political scientists have analyzed some
aspects of the dynamics of Arguntine sectoralization. See, for example,
Wynia (1978).
polistic manufacturing encerprises producing the bulk of protected
manufacturing output on the other.
The effectiveness of these urban groups has been such that, in fact,
they have conme to power on many occasions. As a consequence, the government
has many times identified the national interest with sectoral interests to an
extent that must be quite unparalleled in other countries. 1/
Many economists have abstracted from this political economy when
constructing their models. Among these, those including an analysis of the
income distribution effects of exchznge rate policies are important for under-
standing sor of the pressures that policymakers might face when designing
their policies. The best-known and most influential theoretical construct of
the eich_,ge rate-income distribution-output nexus has been worked out by Dlaz
Alejandro (1965). In one of his influential works on the Argentine economy he
concludes that "...by introducing explicitly income redistribution considera-
tions into devaluation theory, it has been possible to view devaluation as
just another weapon in the struggle of different sectors in the economy for
larger shares in the national income."
- - ~ This"''cnclusion &omes from th fac&-that the price of food
Argentina's exportable - faced by urban workers is tied to the level of the
exchange' rate. '.'MA-so, the demand for urban iridustrial products;' which' because
of the very high protection they enjoy can be,tireated as non-tradables;,;is -
positively reLated to the real wage. In this'contex. a devaluation by
increasing the price of food reduces real wages, and because the price'
elasticity of food demand is low, the devaluation also reduces aggregate
1! Di Tella (1983).
demand for industrial products and, therefore, urban employment. It is
usually assumed that the rural sector responds slowly to price incentives. In
these circutmstances, it is also possible for a devaluation to trigger
recession.
It is reasonable to quarrel with each one of the assumptions that
are necessary for this result to hold true, but such an exercise escapes the
objective of this paper. On the other hand, these n,odels show the economic
logic behind some characteristics of the Argentine political-economy that help
to explain why a devaluation can be strongly resisted by policymakers. 1/ Ir
fact, Diaz Alejandro's exchange rate model has been used to interpret economic
policies and consequences of the 1973-1976 Peronist government. 2/
A major and persistent shortcoming of the Argentine policy decision
mechanism is that few policymakers believe that in the long-run the exchange
rate does not determine income distribution, and that in the short-run it is
an inappropriatp instrument for this purpose and for stabilization objectives
as well.
Thus, the-natural tendency of the political economy has been to fix
the exchangeirate and overvalue the&domest;dc, currency. This tendencyis.rein-
forced by the strong inflationary bias of the economy and the temptation-which
ari5es in suc-h"'circumstances to contrqol,bthe>tinfl iationary process by whatever
policy instruments :are deemed appropri'ate ''including exchange rate pplic'ies;
1/ To be sure Diaz Alejandro policy recommendations were to "...divorce
exchange rates and other relative prices as much as possible from the
determination of income distribution..." (1965, p.192).
2/ See Canitrot (1979).
During the years of the military government, exchange rate policies
find their theoretical backgrounds in the "monetary approach to the balance of
payments." In the recent literature, this point has been stressed by Machinea
(1983), and FernAndez (1985).
This approach is based on a highly aggregative model that focuses
attention on the balance of payments adjustment process of an open economy
under fixed exchange rate policies. The model does not distinguish between
consumer groups nor between economic sectors and, therefore, income distribu-
tion considerations are omitted from the analysis. Also, because these models
assume a competitive neoclassical mechanism to be working, full employment is
guaranteed, and thus output effects are usually excluded from the analysis.
Because of these differences, monetary models stand in sharp contrast to
Keynesian constructs such as the one developed by Dlaz Alejandro.
Paradoxically, because of the fact that the inflationary trend of
the economy had not vanished, one can also rationalize the adoption of a
preannounced exchange rate policy as an anti-inflation instrument through an
attempt to influence expectations. In fact, Rodriguez (1979) developed-a
-tGbr'ei- 1' del'howin 4 o -
stylized theoreticai model'showing how thead'justment'process associated vith
preannounced exchange rate could work.
LInft;conclusion, the Argentine'exp`eri'ence shows that its persistent-
inflation' has tempted policymakers of different poiitical regimes-and'holding
different economic views to use the exchange rate as a stabilizing instru-
ment. But "realistic" exchange rate policies are key to a successfiil"tra'de
1/ Fernandez (1985) has asserted that this model "... can be considered a
very close approximation of what the economic team might have had in mind
at the time of announcing the devaluation schedule."
liberalization attempt. Thus, unless the natural tendency of policymaking is
modified, ancd/or the inflation rate is significantly reduced, the Argentine
experience shows that a liberalization attempt in an inflatic.nary economy
might fail not because of the inflation per se, but because of the natural
tendency of the policy decision mechanism to misuse policy instruments for
stabilization purposes.
2. Policy segmentation, administrative rules and inter-agency disputes
The Central Bank is probably the most powerful governmental office
in Argentina. Su!ch power comes from the crucial role it has historically
played in implementing economic policies. Such economic policies have
traditionally been based on the importance of the governmaent for determining
the allocation of resources. In this context, the Central Bank has played a
key role in controlling: a) the exchange rate; b) international payments; c)
nominal interest rates; and d) credit allocation. Control brings power, and
those exercised by the Central Bank are key to explaining historical economic
developments of the Argentine economy.
But^because these cbntrols are not-always suEficient to achievle
balance of payments objectives, other governmental offices are pushed to
adjust' tTheinstiuments th y'contro l Thih'eha'sbeen the case, for examfiple,
with the Secretary of Commerce. h past when the country payment-s.,
problems worsened this government -off;ice increased trade barriers by: a)
prohibi'ting specific imports, b) raising"tariffs, c) introducing import
licenses, and quotas, etc. It is important to stress that this behavior is
not constrained by rules. This can be most clearly appreciated from quoting
the first article of the Argentine trade law-(20545): "... protection of
workers and national output includes tariff and fiscal procedures whose aim is
to strengthen the output of enterprises of nationals with the objectives of:
finishing with the cultural, technological and economic dependence of the
country; seeking autarky in the production of strategic and/or fundamental
goods and services ... , and to assure a supply of goods that would guarantee
an adequate standard of living to the Argentine nation." The statement shows
quite clearly the nationalistic spirit that guides the application of trade
policies.
An important change of this policy segmentation among government
offices occurred as a result of the policy reforms. This time policy behavior
of the Secretary of Commerce was constrained by the new trade rules. Nca-
tariff barriers were not allowed to be changed, and the path of the tariff
structure had been preannounced.
But because of the low real exchange rate and resulting surge of
import penetration, the Secretary of Commerce received increasing
protectionist requests. Initially, the reaction was for this Secretary to
favor a real devaluation. The most important piece of evidence that this
SecretariatfJpdrepared"for argui'ng in fivor ofrthis policy was purchisings.power:
parity *,PPP') estimates' of the exchange6'ra'te.
- A ;~' h-What could'have these6estimates shown? Table.8 shows one'amongtheW,'-vv
sets of'PPP exchange rate series that can eventually be constructed-.; Heee I
take,.1978 as the base period and compute"m6rnth,ly PPP estimates by-using
domestic-and U.S. WPI. The estimates s.how that-starting in.January .1979 the
domestic currency followed an appreciating trend, and in December 1980, the
PPP exclhange rate was 81% higher than the official exchange rate.' Had we
chosen ainother reasonable base period the discrepancy would have been higher,
simply because in earlier years high export barriers and severe restrictions
on capital flows were in effect, and the equilibrium exchange rate was higher
than the 1978 rate. 1/ Clearly, the economic minister had to decide between a
devaluation or a continuation of policies. His decision was to persist with
the Central Bank policies. Inter--agency disputes continued, but became
irrelevant after this decision had been made.
Because devaluation was resisted, the Secretary of Conmnerce avoided
the constrained behavior implicit in a program of preannounced tariff
reductions and began granting "import relief" by raising official prices and
imposing anti-dumping and countervailing duties. Also, a 15Z across-the-board
countervailing tariff on imports from Brazil was imposed. Finally, increased
export subsidies to different industries including beef were grantedl
In this regard the trade liberalization attempt made even more
inappropriate the trade lesson given by the traditional trade policy
mechanism. The experiment taught that countervailing and anti-dumping duties
could be usedi for granting protection.
Several other changes implied important departures from traditional
bureaucratic behav-ior and led to other' iner agency disputes. For example,
traditionally, as the budget deficit grows, th'e Secretary of Finance raises
export tatx rates. But this behaviraii-:hot permitted under the new
rules of the gae8. Under these condiation-s the growing deficit which was
taking place wa's viewed as a threat-to"th'e instability of preannounced
exchange rate policies and more generaLly of the new economic program. As a
I/ For example 1969. See Nogues (1985) for jjustification of this base.
consequence, inter-agency disputes between the Central Bank and the Secretary
of Finance developed. These are referred to in Arriaz6 (1983).
I have already suggested that given the problems associated with the
sluggishness of the commodity price arbitrage process, which in turn could be
attributed to some extent to characteristics of import policies, the
underlying model behind preannounced exchange rate policies could not work in
practice. But even if these problems had not been present, the underlying
model required a great deal of coordination among government agencies thst
were managing different instruments. This was not the case in the period
under study.
It is important to emphasize a final point. There is unanimous
agreemen: and abundant evidence that the military government was dictatorial and
socially repressive. The dictatorial description also characterized the
economic policy decision mechanism. Economic policies were designed by a
handful of persons - not more than five - which held absolute power and who
were not prepared to discuss and hear criticism to their policies either from
inside or outside the government.
Itiis reasonable to hypothesize that-;the economic disequilibrium
into which the-economy was put during 1980 could not have occurred irn a-mor.*
democratLc d'eisiin-making, process. In --surch] an"'environment, .I hypothesize,-,
., _ , .;, , , t2.. 
the social te nsions that developed from'-''the inappropriateness of the exchenge
rate and other distortion.sry policies w;ould have2been given a higher weight,
and probably corrective actions would have bee'n taken sooner.
3. Trade liberalization and the military industrial complex
In Argentina, the military own the bulk of output produced by the
steel industry. Because of its economic importance and the strong
interrelationship it has with other sectors, the efficiency with which this
industry operates determines to a great extent the competitiveness of other
sectors. Unfortunately, this industry in Argentina can be characterized as an
inefficient protected monopoly.
Th.e steel market is shared by two enterprises: SOMISA (Sociedad
Mixta Siderorgica Ar,entina), and PROPULSORA. The first is owned by the
military and is in practice administered by DIRECCION GENERAL DE FABRICACIONES
MILITARES (DCFM). PROPULSORA is owned by an Italian group: TECHINT.
During several years SOHISA was the sole producer of basic metal
products of iron and steel and grew thanks to a myriad of both open and hidden
subsidies. After ten years of negotiating with the military, PROPULSORA began
in the early 70s producing coils and other steel products for the domestic
market. Since then, legal barriers created by numerous decrees have served to
eliminate potential competition from domestic output.
*~~~ i,I it.,I, 
'Around,the same time that PROPULSORA)started its operations, import
licenses on the products produced by these enterprises became mandatory.
-According to Decrees 4 and 37 of 1968andi 197 0j'timport licenses will he
granted when domestic output "... does not-covrer domestic demand ... " These
licenses are administered by DCFH. Therefore, the market is completely
segmented, and no other enterprise has been able to produce at a significant
scale the most important products elaborated by SOMISA and PROPULSORA. This
market: can very well be defined as a "sanctuary of protection."
In 1980, of the toCdl value of intermediate steel products imported,
52% entered the country with a license. Only one ten-digit Brussels Trade
Nomenclature (WTN) position (coilsi accounted for 64% of licensed imports, and
3 BTN positions accounted for 90%. SOMISA and PROPULSORA actually imported
64% of these licensed imports.
Not only are licensed imports highly concentrated, but their
associated rents are apparently quite significant. For example, in 1977
domestic ex-factory prices of coils exceeded international CIF prices by
62%. In late 1980, the Argentine domestic price exceeded the international
price by more than 200% (Table 9). The domestic enterprises were, therefore,
collecting the bulk of the rents associated with the licenses they themselves
were managing.
Finally, according to the most recent ERP's estimates, the basic
metal industry was receiving in 1977 above average rates of protection (Nogues
1978). For example, the basic industries of rion-ferrous metals (SIC 372) and
iron and steel (SIC 371) had corresponding weighted average estimates of ERP's
of 88% and 85% respectively. They ranked secona and third among fifteen
three-digit SIC id4-s'Frites. 1/
5 ' ' Suimming up,'a haridful of 'enterprises in the Argentine'basic metal
in'dbustry-are completely'protected from domest-idccompetition by legal .barriers -
arid' from foreign cdimpeti:ion by import licenses-. -Issues surrounding these
enterprises are assessed by zhe military an'd have been out of the influence of
economic ministers. In effect during the military government, the miLitary
1/ The non-ferrous basic metal industry is essentially aluminum, which is
also protected with import licenses.
reserved for themselves an economic instrument - licenses - to protect their
industry. Recall, that during 1979 and 1980 protection to all other import
substitute industries was granted exclusively thtough tariffs.
For our purposes, it is also important to stress that in a
liberaliza:ion process, the steel industry was going to be affected, even if
it could escape the tariff rule that had been set for the other import-
subtituting industries. This is because demand for its products come from
other protected industries such as cars and capital goods that were in all
likelihood going to be hurt by lower import barriers. 1/ Thus, in the long
run, and in an across the board liberalization process, it appears that the
military industrial complex had little chance of sur:iving unless its managers
showed the capacity to adjust to import competition. The evidence suggests
that they were not willing to confront this challenge. The econem.1c interests
of the political power structure were not compatible with import l;.beraliza-
t;on policies.
4. Role of Institutions
The qcuote in point, 2 of this-' sectiohfnfrom the Argentine trade law
shows"'quite c early that economic'self-'skifficien y has been a major
ideoldgi'cal forcgof the Argentine economic decision mechanism. Policy
reforms that seek- to increase the''role of competi'tive forces and international
economic interdependence must include a-major attempt to change the nature of
1/ This might be one reason explaining why the car industry was excluded from
the tariff program and, in fact, received above average protection during
the military government. See FIEL (1980) for a description of import
-policies protecting the car industry.
Lhe economic decision mechanism, i.e., to create new institutions. 1/ At this
stage I will suggest the importance of two characteristics that should
accompany a major shift in trade policies.
The first is obvious, and probably b_cause of this it is
important. The new decision mechanism must have a clear understanding of the
role played by different policy instruments, particularly in regard to their
approoriateness for resource allocation, as well as income distribution and
stabilization objectives. The paper has offered evidence showing that the
economic cabinet of the military government did not show a clear understanding
of the role played by the major policy instruments under their control.
The second suggestion is to balance the power held by differ?nt
groups participating in the policy decision mechanism. It is a balanced and
more democratic mechanism - one where corsumers', exporters' and importers'
interests have approximately similar weig!its - that is expected to result in a
long lasting liberalization. The major risk of not attempting to introduce
these changes is that when bad times reappear, policy reforms will be
concluded and protectionist policies reintroduced.
Attempting to construct a balancedjpolicy decision mechanism is a
major challenge which has rot been taken upf'or.decades. Obviously it is not
expec.ed for a repressive military dictatorship to do this anyhow. This, L
'ypothesize, explains that when internationa-l`payments problems reappeared
during 1981-82, ic proved easy and politically costless to close the
economy. This wns done by another military government.
1/ Hamilton defines institution as "...connotes a way of thought or action of
some prevalence and permanence, which is embedded in the habits of a group
or the customs of a people" (Hamilton, 1936, p. 84).
VII. Final Remark
This paper has analyzed the nature of economic controls that were
imposed by Argentina's military government between 1976 and 1981. Behind
these controls was an attempt to bring down the inflation rate. But che
government was unable to balance the budget, and as a consequence, the
fundamental cause of the inflation pcoblem remained present.
Tle first characteristic of controls studied in this paper was their
instability. Because of this, the absolute and relative prices of macro
variables such as real wages, real interest rates and the real exchange rate
fluctuated significautly.
A second characteristir refers to the severity of the distortions
which these controls created. For example, there does not appear to be in the
post-World War [I history of Argentina, nor of other developing countries,
fluctuations in real effective exchange rates as great as the one recorded for
Argentina.
T'he nature of these policy-induced distortions was such, that they
could only be sustained with important capital inflows. Therefore, the
severity of the controls-lasted as long--as the''international-financial
community supplied the necessary financial resources. Unfort"unately, this
pro'cess went too far, and by the time when policy reversals began to be
implemented, Argentina's foreign debt h'd .ncre'ased to historical high'levels,
'i.e., a level that will be a major economic problem for years to come.
T this environment, policie- resulting in reductions of import
barriers were introduced. But given the severity of the macro-economy
disequilibrium, these policies could not be sustained. In any case, I have
stressed that these policies were also ts great extent driven by anti-
inflation objectives. I have also argued that the long-run economic interest
of those who held effective political control at that time were not compztiZIe
with trade liberalization policies. The military industrial complex simply
escaped the trade policy rules that were imposed on other tradeable sectors.
Tahle 1: EXCHANGE RATES (pesos per dollar) AND F-AEIGN TRADS, AKMWINA, 1969-198;
Year Export Inport PYP-FR 2! Black Mr*ct (3)%(2) (4)Z(2) ?_D-FK 2/ P?P-PUrER 3- Ei .£-orts thports Trade BALwnr-
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)(TYoo5°2f DolLA)
=-.I .. -__ 
1969 3.S0 3.50 3.50> 1.51 1,hO 1.00 3.50 3.50 1,612.1 1,576.1 J6.0
;9CIO0 3.67 3.79 - 3.894 3.86 1.03 1.02 3.32 3.47 ',7;3.2 1,694.0 79.2
1971 4.58 4.S9 5.25 6.14 '.12 1.31 2.95 3.21 1,740.3 1,868.1 -!27.8
1472 7.95 8.21 8.82 11-.52 1.07 1.40 2.91 3.)7 1,941.1 1,904.7 36.4
1973 9.07 9.36 11.80 11.79 1.?o 1.26 2.21 2.6, 3,266.0 2,229.5 1,036.5
1974 9.10 8.89 11.90 16.25 1.34 1.83 1.75 2.56 3,930.7 3.634.9 295.8
1975 25.80 21.34 31.85 72.16 1.49 3.38 1.43 2.35 2,961.3 3,946.5 -985.2
1976 189.46 149.70 18i.9/ 257.79 1.22 1.7) 1.68 2.92 3,916.1 3,033.0 883.1
1977 402.35 410.01 42E.89 423.13 1.05 1.03 1.85 3.43 5,651.8 4,161.5 1,490.3
1978 792.38 805.37 8PM.29 808.?9 1.00 1.00 1.48 2.94 6,399.5 3,833.7 2,565.8
1979 1,3'6.52 1,361.89 1,794.40 !,?39.92 1.32 0.98 1.00 2.25 7,809.9 tb,7CP3.8 1,109.1
1980 1,333.01 1,855.23 2,756.27 1,849.33 1.49 !.00 0.78 2.03 R,028.0 10,540.6 -2,512.6
1981 4,348.62 - 5,294,3 6,090.96 - 0.7 - 9,150.0 9,170.0 -20.0
1/ The purchasing pnwr parity is constructed .ith wholesale priee irdexes and ttg u.s. as thc reference oLntry. 19/7 we use I
as the base year. FY8l`ize 1978 as-the base year.
2/ ITport exchae rate deflated by the wholesale price index. Base 1969=1
3/ Import exchmiar,c rate ailtipLUed by the ratio of U.S. to Argentine wholesale prIcoL In4exs with 1969 as the h1ase year.
F=raetbltci'- ftpr-r;lP.n- lr 4 ehit(eea qe)
Table 2: ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE REAL FACTOR PRICES, ARCEN1'INA 1969-1980
Real Annual Interezt ' v-change Rate Ratio of Factor Prices
Year Real Wagea 1/ Rate Z 2/ elaise 169 = 100) (1) t (2) 3/ (1) t (3)
(base 1969
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1969 100 7.8 100 1.00 1.00
1973 101 -19,4 76 -- 1.33
1974 110 0.8 73 10.73 1.51
1975 107 -24.6 67 -- 1.60
1976 55 -16.5 ,3 -- 0.66
1977 59 3.1 98 1.48 0.60
1178 68 13.7 84 0.39 0.81
1979 84 -0.0 64 -- 1.31
1980 103 24.1 58 0.33 1.78
1/ For 1978, 1979 and 1980 real wages correspond to those observed in the last quarter of
each year.
2/ Real ipterest rates,-are nominal lending rates'7defltA ed by the WPIr.
3/ Estimateds'by'equating't'he,1969 real-interest,'ratetto 100 and disregarding nyears,lwrth-
negative'val-uei.`s.
Source: Column (1): Machinea (1983) Table 2.9;',Co,lumhv,(2): Nogues (1983) Tab,le':8;
' Column (3): Table I-of the paper.
Table 3: QUARTERLY ESTIMATES OF DOMESTIC INFLATION, INTERNATIC
INFLATION AND DEVALUATION (X), ARCENTINA 1979-198X
Quarter Accumulat
Year I II III IV (1979 + 19
A. Argentine Inflation as Measured by the Wholesale Price Index
1979 28.3 28.2 29.8 7.2
1980 12.8 17.5 8.8 9.0 260.0
B. International Inflation as Measured by the U.S. Wholesale Price Index
1979 3.8 3.8 4.4 3.7
1980 6.1 1.9 1.7 2.8 31.8
C. International Inflation 1/
1979 5.8 4.7 5.8 4.3
1980 2.9 2.8 3.9 1.1 35.8
D. Devaluation of the Peso-Dollar Exchange Rate
1979 15.2 13.8 11.8 9.9
1980 7.9 6.1 4.3 3.1 98.3
1/ This series was estimated by appilying imnternational prices to the weighting sche
the Argentinean WPI. Essentially, tdeaprice dlta used are quotations-inrinte'rna
markets ftor several primary export'ble c'mmodi ien and the U.S..WPI foir`mintuiact
Source: Aut.hor's elaboration.
Table 4: EFFECTIVE EXCHANCE RATES FOR DIFFERENT CATEGORIES
OF EXPORTS, ARGENTINA 1975-1981 1/
Sector 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 198L
I. Norninal Values
A. Primary
1. Agriculture 2/ 14 101 340 734 1241 1749 4118
2. Bovine neat 17 176 322 652 1787 1880 4434
3. Raw Hides 13 138 327 656 1086 1425 4254
4. Raw Wool 13 134 318 722 1208 1014 4525
B. Exportables
Manufactures 3/ l8 185 374 775 1317 1979 4679
C. Non--Traditional
Manufactures 4/ 29 249 472 941 I09 2210 5751
II. Real Values 5/
A. Primary
1. Agriculture 519 620 846 734 498 400 449
2. Bovine meat 630 1080 801 652 516 430 484
3. Raw Hides 481 847 813 656 436 326 464
4. Raw Wool 481 822 791 722 485 415 494
B. Exportable
Manufactures 667 1135 930 775 528 453 510
C. Non--traditional
Manufactures 1074 1528 1174 941 645 505 627
1/ Except f'or 1981 the individual producE-e-stimates are weighted by FOB
export 'values to obtain sectoral estima rs. .For 1981 these estimatesL'are
- simple averages'ofi individual products.. --
2/ Includes wheat, maize, ar,d sorghum.
3/ Includes several-types of vegetable oi'ls, corned bcef, vegetable-tanning;i
processed hides,,washed wool and wheat flour.-
4/ Does not include financial subsidies. The underlying produict sample.
includes *iire, mctors, general machinery', agricultural machinery,
tractors, and synthetic rubber.
5/ Deflated by the WPI with 1978=1.
ur (WPI)Source: Nogu.~s (1983) Table 18. (I - Et) (wi
Table 5: RATIO OF DOMESTIC TO INTERNATIONAL PRICES, ARGENTINA 1976-1981
Base 1978 IV=1.O
Year and Quarter Exportables Importables Ratio (1)Z(2)
(1) (2) (3)
1976 I .59 .69 .85
1976 IV .7 .70 1.04
1977 IV .82 .84 .98
1978 IV 1.00 1.00 1.00
1979 IV .98 1.30 .75
1980 IV 1.13 1.58 .72
1981 I 1.07 1,61 .67
1981 IV 1.02 1.13 .91
Source Machinea (1983) Table 3.7a
Table 6: LECAL TARIFFS AND REALIZED PROTECTION: ARGENTINA
DURINC 1976 AND 1977
Realized
Legal Tariff Rates (x) Protection
Industry Code and Name October '76 December '77 Rates (I)
321 Textiles 107.7 57.4 41.1
322 Clothing 200.0 95.0 79.2
341 Paper and paper products 28.9 29.0 30.8
351 Industrial chemicals 75.6 35.2 36.6
352 Other chemicals 98.8 17.0 0.0
355 Rubber products 110.0 45.0 29.6
362 Glass 94.3 41.8 12.3
369 Other non-metallic mineral
products 66.0 11.0 0.0
371 Basic ferrous metal
products 88.8 48.2 60.7
372 Basic non-ferrous metal
products 68.5 44.5 47.0
381 Metal products 132.9 45.9 10.0
382 Non-electrical machinery 98.3 65.5 19.7
383 Electrical machinery 89.1 61.3 55.7
384 Transport equipment 127.0 87.2 29.7
385 Scientific and other
equipment 80.0 50.0 73.3
Weighted Average 93.7 52.7 37.1
Source: Table A-1in-Noguks- (1978).
Table i: SCHEDULE OF TARIFF REDUCTIONS, 1979-1984
Type of Goods l/ Legal Tariff 2/ Proportional Reduction 3/ (x)
Structure 1979 (x) 1979-1981 1981-1984
Food, Beverages 1 39 21 61
Tobacco 2 45 18 62
3 52 23 60
Consumer Goods 1 65 17 44
2 75 17 44
3 85 14 44
Intermediate 1 44 35 50
Products 2 46 17 45
3 48 20 40
Agri:ultural 1 21 19 41
Products of 2 25 16 43
Primary 'Origin 3 29 14 44
Other Primary 1 36 22 46
Inputs 2 39 21 45
3 42 19 41
Goods Not Produced
in Argentina 10 0 0
Capital Goods 1 46 17 47
2 48 20 43
3' 50 16 6,
1/ There are-t'hree classes within each comno4dity classification. This has
traditionally served the purposes of p ovi'di'ng more protection tb'gobds"
with high"r value added.
2/ First quarter 1979.
3/ Underlying observations correspond to first quarter of each year.
Source: Guia Practica del Exportador e Importador (1979).
Table 8: MONTHLY lPP AND OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATES, ARGENTINA 1979-81 1/
(pesos per dollar)
1979 1980 1981
Month Exchanlge Rate Exchange Rate Exchange Rate
Official PPP Official PPP Official ppp
January 1,055.50 1,254.51 1,663.50 2,436.18 2,031.ii0 3,714.63
February 1,104.50 1,333.67 1,7U%6.5o 2,510.98 2,2f,0.00 3,843.02
March 1,156.50 1,424.62 1,745.50 2,605.72 2,368.00 4,020.34
April 1,209.50 1,500.95 1,785.50 2,718.74 3,165.00 4,378.17
May 1,263.50 1,603.U4 1,821.50 2,848.43 3,279.00 4,688.74
June 1,316.50 1,747.25 1,854.50 3,004.57 4,425.00 5,287.92
July 1,369.50 1,852.59 1,884.50 3,093.10 4,887.00 5,844.16
August 1,421.50 2,077.05 1,910.50 3,162.92 5,327.00 6,316.33
September 1,472.50 2,175.67 1,9i3.50 3,264.78 5,807.00 6,737.26
October 1,522.50 2,209.37 1,952.50 3,447.25 6,247.00 7,129.06
November 1,571.50 2,285.85 1,972.50 3,551.67 6,774.00 7,764.31
December 1,618.50 2,343.17 1,992.50 3,610.99 7,016.90 8,492.05
1/ PFF corresponcs to an average of estimates-pdr,chaaing power parity exchanget,rates
constructed with WPI and CPI indices ofŽiArgentina and U.S. 1978 is the base,period.
Source: Noguts (1983) Table 7.
Table 9: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL PRICES OF INTERMEDIATE STEEL
PRODUCTS (current U.S. dollars per ton), 1976-1981
Coils 14minsted in hot Coils laminated in cold
Year Domestic International (1)t(2) Domestic International (4)t(5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1976 1/ 441 223 1.98 445 290 1.53
1977 481 198 2.43 516 252 2.05
1978 505 282 1.79 493 313 1.58
1979 626 347 1.80 628 373 1.68
1980 906 333 2.72 828 383 2.16
1981 2/ 859 318 2.70 862 366 2.36
1/ Monthly aLverages between September to December.
2/ Monthly averages between January and June.
Source: Estimuated from monthly data presented in Secretaria de Comercio (1982) Table 12.
International prices correspond to export prices of the European Community.
Domestic prices correspond to ex-factor- orice of the domestic monopolist.
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